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THE AGENT-ATHLETE RELATIONSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL
AND AMATEUR SPORTS: THE INHERENT POTENTIAL FOR
ABUSE AND THE NEED FOR REGULATION
INTRODUCTION
Interactions between sports agents1 and athletes in the context
of professional and amateur sports are recent phenomena. The
business of athlete management itself was relatively obscure as lit-
tle as twenty years ago.2 The great boom in agent representations
that started in the late 1960's has resulted today in the relation-
ship between athletes and their agents becoming almost as impor-
tant as that between athletes and the teams that employ them."
Unfortunately for athletes, club owners, fans, and honest and effi-
cient sports agents, 5 the number of problems resulting from agent-
athlete interactions have swelled almost as fast as the ranks of the
agents themselves. It has become apparent that a disturbingly high
number of agents have not always performed in the best interests
1. An agent has been generally defined as "one who acts for or in the place of another
by authority from him," or "a person who represents another in contractual negotiations,"
or "a business representative whose function it is to bring about, modify, effect. . . contrac-
tual obligations between the principal and third persons." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 1 (1958).
2. The legendary coach of the Green Bay Packers professional football team, Vince
Lombardi, had a crude but effective method of frustrating the fledgling attempts of sports
agents to break into the field of organized football in the early 1960's. When informed that
an agent had come to negotiate player Jim Ringo's contract, Lombardi walked into his per-
sonal office and closed the door. Upon his return a few minutes later he told the would-be
negotiator, "You are negotiating with the wrong team. Mr. Ringo has just been traded to
Philadelphia." Kennedy & Wilson, Money in Sports, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 24, 1978, at
47.
3. An agency relationship between an athlete (the "principal") and a sports manager
(the "agent") is created by an agreement between the parties. 3 AM. JUR. 2d Agency § 17
(1962).
4. Today, owners of professional sports teams expect that almost all of their players
will conduct negotiations with the aid of some kind of representative. House of Representa-
tives Select Committee Inquiry into Professional Sports, H.R. Rep. No. 1786, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (Jan. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Committee Inquiry], reprinted in PRACTISING LAW
INSTITUTE, REPRESENTING THE PROFESSIONAL ATHLETE 203 (1978) [hereinafter cited as PRAC-
TISING LAW INSTITUTE].
5. "Most agents are reputable, but a shocking percentage are not ... ." Kennedy &
Wilson, supra note 1, at 48. See, e.g., Golenbach, Now Calling Signals, The Lawyer-Agent,
JURIS DOCTOR, Oct. 1971, at 49.
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of the athlete, or sports in general.'
This Comment will focus on the agency relationship between
the athlete and his representative. The major areas of discussion
will be the ramifications of the agent-athlete relationship, the
problems that grow out of it, and potential solutions.
This Comment will also discuss the contrast between lawyer
and non-lawyer agents, emphasizing the crucial impact this dis-
tinction has on the well-being of the athlete. Finally, a discussion
has been included on the distinctions between the agent-athlete re-
lationship in professional and amateur sports.
I. THE PRACTICAL NECESSITY OF AN ATHLETE RETAINING AN
AGENT
Opinion as to whether or not all or most athletes need the as-
sistance of sports agents is varied. For example, some of the ath-
letes themselves are strongly against the idea of third-party repre-
sentation, preferring to negotiate with team owners on their own.2
On the other hand, an agent's service can be of great benefit to
an athlete.' An agent can insure that an athlete takes full advan-
tage of his publicity value through endorsements, appearances,
publishing and other money-making endeavors.9 Whether or not
an athlete properly exploits his promotional opportunities may ac-
tually have an effect on his performance on the field. For example,
some commentators have noted that "[t]he athlete's mental condi-
tion, and his on-the-field performance, can be greatly influenced by
his personal financial position."10 An athlete performing under a
long-term, low-paying contract may come to feel exploited if he
eventually develops his talents. As a result both parties may be-
6. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 319 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
WEISTART & LOWELL]. "[Such a] suggestion is by no means hypothetical." Agents are "the
most destructive forces in sports today." Committee Inquiry, supra note 4, at 70.
7. For example, professional tennis player Chris Evert has emphatically stated that
"[a]gents are anathema." Quoted in Kennedy & Wilson, supra note 2, at 49. Professional
football great O.J. Simpson is "against business agents because they allow the athlete to rely
on someone else. Once a player's career is over, these people aren't around." Id. at 47.
8. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 6, at 319. For comparative statistics of the value of
contracts signed by first year players with and without the aid of an agent, see S. GALLNER,
PRO SPORTS: THE CONTRACT GAME 40 (1974).
9. See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 6, at 319. This is an often overlooked point, as
many athletes are not as aware as they should be of financial opportunities away from the
playing field. See Golenbach, supra note 5, at 50.
10. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 6, at 319.
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come dissatisfied; the player because he is not being paid an
amount commensurate with his abilities and the club owner be-
cause he has to tolerate a disgruntled, nonproductive employee.
Case law exemplifies situations where an athlete would unde-
niably have been better off had he had the advice of a competent
agent. For example, in Los Angeles Rams Football Club v. Can-
non,11 the District Court for the Southern District of California al-
lowed a college football player, Billy Cannon, to breach a contract
he had signed with a professional football team.12 The court's deci-
sion in part hinged on the fact that the team had coerced Cannon,
who had negotiated the agreement on his own, into signing a con-
tract that was not in his best interests."3 Had Cannon been aided
by a properly trained sports agent, it would be reasonable to con-
clude that the whole problem could have been avoided.
1 4
The advantages of the sports agent can also be reflected in the
traditional make-up of the professional sports' power structure. As
recently as the early 1960's, professional sports resembled a dicta-
torship, with the club owners wielding a great degree of control
over their employees. Baseball, with its 1922 Supreme Court ex-
emption from the antitrust laws, was the primary example of
sports' monopolistic nature. 5 The standard reserve clauses found
11. 185 F. Supp. 717 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
12. The facts of the Cannon case are as follows: In November, 1959, Louisiana State
University football star Billy Cannon signed a three-year contract with the Los Angeles
Rams of the National Football League. One month later, Cannon revoked any offer he may
have made to play for the Rams, claiming that he had never entered into a binding agree-
ment with them. The Rams subsequently brought suit against Cannon for an order declar-
ing the existence of a valid contract. Under the rules of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA), the signing of a contract with a professional team would render a
player ifieligible for the remainder of his collegiate career. NCAA CONSTITUTION, art. III, §
1(c) (1979). Taking note of this provision in ruling that there was no valid contract, District
Judge Lindberg pointed out that he felt certain that Cannon would not intentionally dis-
qualify himself from the upcoming Sugar Bowl, which is a prestigious post-season college
football playoff game. 185 F. Supp. at 725.
13. The court was persuaded by the fact that Cannon was "untutored and unwise...
in the ways of the business world." 185 F. Supp. at 726. "He was without counsel and advice
. ." Id.
For a description of tactics that are commonly used by owners against athletes who are
not represented by an agent, which are designed to induce them into signing contracts for
less than they would otherwise receive, see GALLNER, supra note 8, at 40-45.
14. As the court pointed out, this was not Cannon's "chance in a lifetime to turn pro-
fessional which he might lose forever if he did not grab it immediately." 185 F. Supp. at 726.
Thus, proper counseling would have prevented Cannon from signing the contract.
15. Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S.
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in all player contracts gave the athlete a simple option: accept
what the club owner offered or retire.1 6 The advent of the sports
agent helped alleviate to some degree the gross inequality of bar-
gaining power between owners and players. 17
An additional advantage offered by sports agents stems from
the limitations of the professional sports players associations.18 In
recent years, the efforts of the players associations for each sport
have reaped considerable benefits for the athlete. One of the re-
sults of these accomplishments is that minimum wage scales and
basic terms and conditions of employment have been established.19
However, any suggestion that the players associations might aid in
athletes' individual 0 negotiations is weakened by the fact that
200 (1922). Accord Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Flood v. Kuhn, 407
U.S. 258 (1972).
16. Many commentators have pointed out the inherent inequities present in this situa-
tion. See, e.g., Note, The Balance of Power in Professional Sports, 22 ME. L. REV. 459
(1970): "This bargaining imbalance is inconsistent with the premises of our free enterprise
system and must be eliminated if the professional sports world is to avoid a total breakdown
in labor-management relations." Id.
Today, however, almost every sport has been forced to ease up on the absolute restric-
tions of the reserve clause. For example, in 1974 major league baseball player Jim Hunter
was declared a free agent by an arbitration panel, which found that the team that employed
him had breached his contract by refusing to pay him all of the compensation that had been
agreed upon. L. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE LAW 197-201, 208 (1977). The deci-
sion became a precedent for other cases that soon followed. See In re Arbitration Between
the Twelve Clubs Comprising the Nat'l League of Professional Baseball Clubs and the
Twelve Clubs Comprising the Am. League of Professional Baseball Clubs and Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n, Dec. No. 29, Grievance Nos. 75-27 & 75-28 (Dec. 23, 1975).
17. For example, lawyer-agent Martin Blackman maintains that the most important
attribute a representative brings to the athlete is that of an equalizer. "If you can imagine a
negotiation between an experienced and senior club official and a boy between the ages of 16
and 21, there is a certain built-in inequity in that negotiation." Testimony during Commit-
tee Inquiry, reprinted in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 4, at 200.
18. The National Football League (NFL), National Hockey League (NHL), National
Basketball Association (NBA), and Major League Baseball all have their own players
associations.
19. See, e.g., S. FISCHLER, SLASHING! 84-95 (1974) [hereinafter cited as FISCHLER], which
depicts the rise of the NHL's Players Association (NHLPA) and the resultant benefits to
the hockey players.
20. Determining the worth of an individual athlete is a complex and subjective process.
Therefore, individual contracts with the respective clubs are negotiated by each player, and
not by the group efforts of the players associations. "This is essentially a product of the
inability to precisely quantify and categorize the range of value of a playing position or any
similar generalization as is common in industrial enterprises." FINAL REPORT OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES SELECT COMMITTEE INQUIRY INTO PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, H.R. Rep. No.
1786, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 71 (Jan. 1977) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
For an outline of "negotiation imperatives" that can aid an agent in assessing the true
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their experience is concentrated in the area of collective bargain-
ing. Agents have thereby been presented with the opportunity to
fill the gap in the representation of athletes resulting from the in-
adequacies of the players associations.
Therefore, although some athletes prefer to deal with manage-
ment on their own,2 many others, especially those with a limited
education or business background, may be significantly aided by
the efforts of a competent agent.
II. RECURRENT PROBLEMS AND ABUSES IN THE AGENT-ATHLETE
RELATIONSHIP
The business of athlete management has been marred by
sports agent-caused problems and abuses, both on the amateur and
professional level. While some of these problems are the result of
incompetent, although honest, efforts, a sizeable number are the
result of fraudulent and deceitful practices. The following analysis
will outline the most frequently recurring types of agent abuse.
A. Agent-Caused Problems in the Context of Professional Sports
Unlike amateurs,22 professional athletes are not prohibited
from acquiring the assistance of an agent. Thus, most agent-athlete
interactions take place on the professional level. As a large per-
centage of all professional athletes retain agents to represent them,
it is imperative that these agents are qualified.23 Unfortunately,
contract value of an individual athlete, see GALLNER, supra note 8, at 35. These imperatives
include: comparative salaries of other players; the team's financial situation; an understand-
ing of the essential terms of the standard player contract; and preventative measures taken
to guard against tactics engaged in by owners to coerce an athlete into signing a contract for
less than he would otherwise receive.
21. Note that some commentators maintain that very few of the players who negotiate
without representation obtain favorable contracts. See Adams, Agents Due Thinner Cuts,
More Slices of Basketball Pie After Merger, The Louisville Courier-Journal & Times, Aug.
11, 1971, reprinted in Hearings on S.2373, Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 433 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
22. See text & accompanying notes 53-64 infra.
23. Most of the agency agreements entered into in professional sports require the ath-
lete to be bound to the agent in an exclusive agency agreement. WEiSTART & LOWELL, supra
note 6, at 323. See GALLNER, supra note 8, at 174 for an example of the standard agency
agreement used in the sports industry. For examples of exclusive agency agreements in the
entertainment industry, see generally PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, COUNSELING PROFESSIONAL
ATHLETES AND ENTERTAINERS (1972).
The exclusive agency notion is critical to the athlete who finds that he has selected an
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this is not always the case.
At the amateur level, the consequences of agent abuses are
generally confined to causing athletes to lose a year or two of col-
lege eligibility. Professional athletes have not been as fortunate.
Agent problems at the professional level include fee gouging,
breach of fiduciary relations, conflicts of interest and outright
fraud.24
1. Misappropriation of funds entrusted to the agent by the
athlete. Many sports agents have the athletes they represent sign
an unlimited power of attorney, which gives the agent total control
incompetent or unscrupulous agent to represent him, as he will render himself liable to his
original agent for his commission or breach of contract damages in the event he enters into
an agreement with a new one. Note, however, that the athlete will not always be liable for
the commission, as the agent will only be entitled to his fee if he can show that he would
have been able to perform the promised acts if he had been allowed to continue. John B.
Robeson Assoc. v. Gardens of Faith, Inc., 226 Md. 215, 172 A.2d 529 (1961). Accord, RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 449, comment d, (1958).
Case law from the real estate brokerage area suggests that the mere description of an
agency as exclusive does not always mean that only the agent has the right to perform the
acts set out in the agreement. See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 6, at 324, which points
out the distinctions between an "exclusive agency" (where the broker is the exclusive agent,
but the principal can sell on his own) and the granting of the "exclusive right to sell" (where
only the agent can sell). Thus, the athlete entering into an exclusive agency agreement still
retains the option of entering into negotiations on his own with the team, sporting goods
manufacturers, and the like.
The fact that most athletes find themselves bound to exclusive agency agreements is
important for an additional reason. The million-dollar contracts that are becoming increas-
ingly common in the professional sports market leaves the lay person with the impression
that the athlete entering into such an agreement has ensured himself of lifetime financial
security. Unfortunately, the athlete often believes it also. In reality, after inflation, taxes,
and wasteful spending by players who never had to deal with large amounts of money
before, the monetary figures are not all that they appear to be, especially since many ath-
letes are not prepared to enter another career once they have retired from professional
sports. As the athlete Will most likely be bound to an exclusive agency, "the realization of
his economic potential may be wholly dependent upon the efforts made by the party desig-
nated as agent." WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 6, at 326. Thus, representation by an
incompetent or unscrupulous agent may destroy an athlete financially.
24. FINAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 73. One example of such agent abuse involves
double billing of clients; for example, the agent and the athlete might negotiate an agency
agreement that states that the team should, after deducting the amount from the player's
salary, pay the agent's commission directly to the agent. After this, the agent will help him-
self to a second commission out of the trust account he has set up for the player's earnings.
Athletes with little or no financial backgrounds often fall victim to such a ploy. See Testi-
mony before the New York Select Committee on Crime: Sports Agents' Practices, New
York, New York at 47-50 (Feb. 1-2, 1978) [hereinafter cited as New York Select
Committee].
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over the player's finances.2 5 This can be a boon to the athlete who
has hired a competent agent, as his financial problems are handled
for him, but it creates easy prey for agents who are unscrupulous.26
One of the most flagrant examples in recent years of misap-
propriation of player funds involved agent Richard Sorkin, who
represented fifty members of the National Hockey League and Na-
tional Basketball Association. In November, 1977, Sorkin, a former
newspaper reporter, was sentenced to three years in jail after
pleading guilty to seven counts of grand larceny, involving a total
amount of approximately 1.2 million dollars.
Sorkin began acting as an agent in 1972. Under the agency
agreements" and the contracts he negotiated, his clients' paychecks
were sent directly to him. He was to deduct his fees and invest the
remainder. Unfortunately, Sorkin only had a "layman's knowledge
of the stock market. 2 8 When his investments led to heavy losses of
his clients' money, Sorkin turned to horse-racing and basketball
bets in an unsuccessful attempt to recoup his losses.29 As for his
clients, none of the money they lost was ever returned to them.
2. The agent's fee. Another frequently occurring problem
arises in the context of the agent's commission. For example,
agents often attempt to negotiate contracts that insure them of
getting their fee (which averages about ten percent of what an ath-
lete earns from all sources) immediately. Such an arrangement
may not be in the best interests of the athlete. For example, if a
player signs a long-term, non-guaranteed contract and the agent
takes his fee immediately, the agent will be over-compensated in
the event that the athlete is not employed for the full term of the
25. Id. at 4.
26. The New York State Hearings brought out an additional problem with the giving of
a power of attorney. It seems that it induces many naive athletes into thinking that their
agents actually are attorneys.
27. People v. Sorkin, No. 46429 (Nassau County Ct., Nov. 28, 1977); sentence aff'd, 64
A.D.2d 680 (2d Dep't 1978). Hockey players Bobby Nystrom and Ron Greschner lost
$145,000 and $86,000, respectively. Basketball player Dennis Duval lost $30,000 and was
forced into bankruptcy.
28. Testimony by Sorkin before the New York Select Committee, supra note 24.
29. Id. Gambling by professional athletes is outlawed by all professional leagues. Hav-
ing a gambler like Sorkin in close contact with players and their finances is certainly not in
the best interests of professional sports. Sorkin also serves as an example of how great the
temptation for the layman to become a sports agent really is, as he managed to earn
$275,000 in his first year as an agent. Id.
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contract.30 In Burrow v. Probus Management, Inc.,31 the district
judge concluded that an agent's advising a football player to accept
a bonus in a lump sum was not in the best interests of the plaintiff,
but was "for the purpose of acquiring immediate funds for the
benefit of the defendant which created additional tax liability in
the amount of approximately twelve hundred dollars." '32
Sports agents have also been charged with taking a commis-
sion that is an outrageously large portion of a player's salary.
While most charge between six and ten percent of an athlete's to-
tal earnings, some charge as much as twenty-five percent of the
value of all contracts the agent has secured for the athlete.33
It is crucial to note that there is more of an inherent potential
for abuse, in regard to the agent's fee, on the part of the non-attor-
ney agents. Although lawyer-agents also tend to charge on the
more lucrative percentage basis in the sports context,34 they are at
least subject to the American Bar Association's sanctions against
charging exorbitant fees. Pursuant to Disciplinary Rule 2-106(A),
"a lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect
an illegal or clearly excessive fee."30 There are court-enforced sanc-
tions for the violation of this canon, as it has been held that the
charging of a "clearly excessive fee" is a ground for discipline.3 "
3. Conflicts of interest. Another potential problem area inher-
ent in the agent-athlete relationship comes under the heading of
30. With a non-guaranteed contract, the player will not get paid if he is injured or
"cut" from the team.
31' Civ. No. 16840 (N.D. Ga., Aug. 9, 1973) (unpublished order). Probus Management
has been investigated by the New York State Attorney General for breaching contracts with
professional athletes.
32. Id. at 6. In addition, the court found that Probus falsified Burrow's tax returns,
failed to pay bills as agreed in the contract and misappropriated an additional $30,000. Bur-
row was awarded $30,000 in compensatory damages, $60,000 in punitive damages and $5,000
in attorney's fees.
33. GALLNER, supra note 8, at 52. Note that "[tihe most respected athletic representa-
tives find the payment of large percentages unethical." Id. Sam Gilbert, a Los Angeles busi-
nessman who has represented many professional basketball players, feels that "no one is
worth 10 percent of a player's earnings." WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 6, at 320 n.707.
34. As opposed to the majority of areas where attorneys usually collect fees on a per
hour basis.
35. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Cannon 2 [hereinafter
cited as ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS].
36. State ex rel. Nebraska Bar Ass'n v. Richards, 165 Neb. 80, 90, 84 N.W.2d 136, 143
(1957). But cf. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES, FORMAL OPs. 27
(1930), 190 (1939), & 209 (1940).
822 [Vol. 30
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conflicts of interest.3 7 Critics of sports agents assert that agents are
often insensitive to potential conflicts which may arise between
their own interests and those of the athletes they represent.38 In a
typical situation, two athletes represented by the same agent may
be seeking contracts from the same team. This might result in the
agent tending to "compromise one client's demands in order to se-
cure a more favorable contract for another."3 9 Conflicts also arise
in the context of fee arrangements. The athlete is better off defer-
ring his income, while the agent may be more concerned with the
athlete's ability to immediately pay his commission.4 °
From a legal standpoint, agency law dictates that an agent has
37. In the event that the agent is an attorney, he will be bound by the restrictions set
forth in the ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMILITY. For example, an agent will
be prevented from representing conflicting interests by the mandate of Disciplinary Rule 5-
105(a): "A lawyer shall decline profferred employment if the exercise of his independent
professional judgement in behalf of his client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by
the acceptance of the profferred employment, or if it would be likely to involve him in rep-
resenting differing interests. .. ."
The Code's Disciplinary Rules [hereinafter cited as DR's] are "mandatory in character."
They establish duties in the sense that their violation may result in discipline. The Code's
Ethical Considerations [hereinafter cited as EC's] are "aspirational" rules which lawyers
should strive to obey but are not designed to serve as a basis for discipline. They are meant
to be a source of principles and policies that are helpful in interpreting the DR's.
38. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 6, at 328. For examples of conflicts of interest that
may arise when player association executives are also agents, see FINAL REPORT, supra note
20, at 76.
39. Id. See GALLNER, supra note 8, at 68. Unless the parties have consented to the
adverse representation, and unless it is obvious that the agent can adequately represent the
interests of each client, the agent has a duty to refrain from acting for a party whose inter-
ests are inapposite to those of the athlete. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsITrrY, DR
5-105(c); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 391, 392, 394 (1958). However, an agent may
be allowed to serve both parties to a transaction if there is no necessary conflict in their
interests. Northrup v. Germania Ins. Co., 48 Wis. 420, 4 N.W. 350 (1880). But, even if there
is a remote possibility of a conflict of interests, the agent will not be permitted to act to
bind his principal. Herman v. Martineau, 1 Wis. 136, 142 (1853).
A classic example of conflicts of interest in the form of adverse representation involving
professional sports is that of agent Richard Sorkin. See text & accompanying notes 27-29
supra. Sorkin was given money by NHL teams in an attempt to induce him to encourage
players he represented to negotiate contracts with them. Testimony before the New York
Select Committee, supra note 24, at 34.
40. See text & accompanying notes 31-32 supra. The professional basketball bidding
wars, note 57 infra, created yet another conflict of interest situation:
Recognizing that the representative exercises a great deal of control over his ath-
lete-client, leagues in bidding wars have employed agents to induce athletes to
sign with their league. Unless'a disclosure is made to the athlete, the agent, who
may also be representing the athlete, is involved in a conflict of interests.
GALLNER, supra note 8, at 53.
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a duty to avoid representing conflicting interests;41 that is, the
agency cannot be used for the benefit of the agent himself or any
person other than the athlete.42 All persons dealing with the
agency must take notice of this rule; in a situation where an agent
is apparently pursuing an interest that conflicts with those of the
athlete, all third parties are charged with notice of the agent's lack
of authority to bind his principal by his actions.
4 3
These agency law restrictions can be waived by the athlete's
implied or express consent to the adverse representation.44 The
problem in the context of professional sports lies in determining
whether or not a client has effectively consented to actions taken
by the agent on his own behalf.45 For example, even though an
agent may have an interest in structuring the athlete's finances in
a manner that will insure that his commission will be paid, the
athlete will find it hard to prove that he had not agreed to the
agent's doing so, even though it would be to the athlete's benefit
from a tax standpoint to defer income to a later date.46 Of course,
in situations involving outright deception it is easier for the athlete
to prove that the agent breached his duty of loyalty.'7
4. Other types of agent abuse. Complaints against agents in
the context of professional sports can take forms other than those
major areas of abuse already outlined.4s For example, agents have
41. See, e.g., Mersky v. Multiple Listing Bureau, Inc., 73 Wash. 2d 225, 437 P.2d 897
(1968). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 394 (1958).
42. Brown v. Holston, 227 Ala. 225, 149 So. 690 (1933). The underlying public policy
basis of this rule is the desire to keep the agent's attention focused on the welfare of the
athlete by preventing external temptation. Mathewson v. Clarke, 47 U.S. (5 How.) 122
(1848).
43. Central West Casualty Co. v. Stewart, 248 Ky. 137, 58 S.W.2d 366 (1933). For ex-
ample, a presumption of fraud will arise against an agent when it appears that he has per-
sonal interests conflicting with the athlete's. Harvey v. Tucker,.136 Kan. 61, 12 P.2d 847
(1932).
44. See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 6, at 329. See, e.g., McConnell v. Cowan, 44
Cal. 2d 805, 807, 285 P.2d 261, 263 (1955).
45. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 6, at 330.
46. Id. at 331. See W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 169 (13th ed. 1964).
47. Id. See, e.g., text & accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
48. Note that the athlete's agent-caused problems will be aggravated by the fact that
the athlete has responsibilities to third parties with whom his agent has dealt on his behalf
(such as the team owner). This becomes critical in the event that the agent has not acted in
the best interests of the athlete. For example, the athlete will be liable for any tortious acts
committed by his agent, due to the doctrine of "respondeat superior." He will also be liable
for acts done by his agent which are within the agent's actual or apparent authority, or
which he ratifies. See 3 Ari. JUR. 2d Agency § 183 (1962). Thus, the athlete will be bound
824 [Vol. 30
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played a role in disrupting existing contractual relationships.9 In
some instances they have done so by inducing a player to jump to
another league.5 0 In other instances, agents have induced athletes
to demand renegotiation of a binding contract.5 1 Furthermore,
agents have been blamed for causing athletes to lose incentive to
perform due to the long-term contracts they negotiated for their
clients. Finally, agents have been accused of paying money to team
owners in exchange for the owners' coercing their players into sign-
ing agency contracts with those particular agents.52
B. Agent-Caused Problems in the Context of Amateur Sports
Any insistence that the intercollegiate athletic program be operated for the
purpose of promoting professional sports opportunities would seriously dis-
tort the fundamental principles of those programs as regards promotion of
the educational value of sports and preclude delineation of "a clear line of
demarcation between college athletics and professional sports."
-National Collegiate Athletic Association Constitution art. 2-2(a).
by any properly executed contracts made by his agent, as long as the agent has acted within
the scope of his authority or in the event that the contract is ratified by the athlete. Id. at §
268.
However, the athlete will not be liable for any unauthorized or unratified acts of the
agent if the agent's authority has been revoked. Id. at § 262; Whiteside v. U.S., 93 U.S. 247
(1876). Third parties contracting with the agency relationship will obviously become obli-
gated to the athlete himself. An authorized or ratified act of the agent has the same legal
consequences as if the athlete had performed the act himself. 3 Am. JUR. 2d, Agency § 287
(1962). Thus, the athlete will be entitled to reap all benefits from any contracts entered into
between his agent and third parties.
Any third party that intentionally aids an agent in violating a duty to an athlete will be
subject to liability. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 312 (1958). For example, persons
who deal with the agent should be aware that knowingly accepting an athlete's money in
payment of the agent's debts will entitle the athlete to recover from the third party. Gerard
v. McCormick, 130 N.Y. 261, 29 N.E. 115 (1891). However, if the athlete is to recover it
must be shown that the third party knew that the funds belonged to the athlete and that
the debt in question was a private debt of the agent. Id.
49. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 6, at 321-22. Sports agents have also induced ath-
letes to disrupt existing contractual relationships with other agents by specifically telling
players to disregard other contracts they have signed. As a result, one professional basket-
ball player ended up signing agency agreements with four different agents. Testimony
before the New York Select Committee, supra note 24, at 40, 45.
Note also situations where the agent is the victim of the breached contract. For example,
in Manton v. California Sports, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 496, 497 (N.D. Ga. 1980), agent Manton
alleged that a professional basketball team induced a player to breach his agency contract in
order to dupe the player into signing for less money.
50. See GALLNER, supra note 8, at 70.
51. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 6, at 322.
52. See New York Select Committee, supra note 24.
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In the event that a college athlete were to sign a contract with
a professional sports team or sports agent, he would forfeit his am-
ateur status, scholarship benefits and college eligibility, thereby
rendering himself ineligible to compete in further intercollegiate
athletic events.53 Although such a result might seem unreasonably
harsh, the courts have held that the revocation of a student's ama-
teur status for signing a contract "is rationally related to the goal
of preserving amateurism in intercollegiate athletics."5"
The most prevalent form of agent abuse on the amateur level
is the signing of college athletes to agency contracts before they
have officially graduated from college. " For example, despite their
53. See, e.g., GALLNER, supra note 8, at 25, which describes the hardship3 endured by
college basketball player David Brent, who signed a professional contract after his second
year of college. The team with which he signed folded due to financial difficulties, and his
once-bright collegiate career was ruined due to his forfeiture of collegiate eligibility.
Note that if a college athlete signs a professional contract he may still be able to partici-
pate on the intercollegiate level, although not in that particular sport. PRACTISING LAW IN-
STITUTE, supra note 4, at 228.
However, recent NCAA regulations provide that an athlete will forfeit his amateur status
altogether if he hires an agent to negotiate his standard player contract with a professional
team. It appears that the new rulings actually penalize a player who has the foresight to hire
a competent agent to represent him. An example of the rule working against the best inter-
ests of the athlete is football player James McCallister, who signed a professional football
contract while still in college. McCallister would have remained eligible to compete on the
intercollegiate level, in a sport other than football, had he not hired an agent to represent
him. See GALLNER, supra note 8, at 54.
54. Shelton v. NCAA, 539 F.2d 1197, 1198 (9th Cir. 1976).
55. It is crucial to note in this context that such practices are usually the actions of
non-attorney agents, due to the ABA's proscription against the solicitation of clients. See
text & accompanying notes 76-87 infra.
The agent problem in the context of amateur athletics goes beyond the actions of the
individual sports agents. Some of the blame falls on the shoulders of the professional
leagues themselves. The formation of the American Basketball Association (ABA) in 1967
created a threat to the National Basketball Association's monopoly on professional basket-
ball. Prior to the merger of the two leagues in 1977, a competitive bidding war between the
respective sides took place in the search to recruit highly talented college players. In an
attempt to force the ABA out of existence, the NBA hired a team of agents to lure college
players to sign with NBA teams. Adams, Pro Basketball War: Ugly Mess, Shrewd Agents,
Louisville Courier-Journal & Times, Aug. 8, 1971, reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note
21, at 424-27. Although some of the agents were attorneys, others included a "dry cleaning
manager, building contractor, stockbroker, college athletic trainer, and accountant." Id. at
426. Some of the agents had oral permission from the still-in-college athletes to represent
them. The athletes paid as much as $300.00 a month until a formal contract could be negoti-
ated after their graduation. Id. The ABA, which needed to become competitive in order to
survive, also indulged in these kinds of practices. The extent of the unethical conduct of
sports agents (as well as the teams themselves) during the basketball bidding wars "could
rival the college basketball fix scandals of the 1940's if the housecleaning ever got rolling."
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awareness of the restrictions of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA), it is estimated that agents sign at least ten
percent of all college football players to agency contracts before
their graduation date."
Another problem created by agents on the amateur level is
that poor advice given to an athlete often results in unnecessary
litigation. Such litigation has frequently arisen in the context of a
professional team secretly signing a college player before his col-
lege eligibility has expired. To render an already unethical situa-
tion even more distasteful, many of the athletes who signed these
secret contracts eventually breached them in order to sign with an-
other team.57 In most of these cases, the courts allowed the athlete
to honor his second contract because they viewed the first as unen-
forceable. 58 One exception, however, was the Tenth Circuit deci-
sion Houston Oilers v. Neely,59 in which football player Ralph
Neely was forced to honor his initial contract with the Houston
Oilers. The court based its holding on the belief that Neely had no
Id. at 427.
56. New York Select Committee, supra note 24.
One example of such unethical conduct involved former college basketball star Jeff Ru-
land of Iona College. Ruland forfeited his amateur status by entering into an agreement
with agent Paul Corvino prior to the 1979-80 college basketball season, which made Corvino
his agent in future professional basketball negotiations. The incident was exposed in April
of 1980. As a result, Ruland was forced to forfeit his senior year of college eligibility. As for
agent Corvino, he was a building contractor who decided to earn some extra income by
representing athletes.
Unfortunately, the Ruland incident is not an isolated one. It appears that the exploita-
tion of naive college athletes by shrewd agents is becoming a widespread practice. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 2, 1978, at D15, col. 2. But see Shannon, Agents Should Be Part of a Changing
College Scene, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1980, 5, at 2. That author argues that college athletes
should be able to obtain the services of a qualified agent sometime during their senior year
in college. In addition, he proposes that the NCAA set up a system of agent registration,
with permanent banishment from the list of registered agents as the punishment for fraudu-
lent practices. The rationale behind such a proposal is that a college player about to embark
on a professional career is entitled to sound financial advice.
57. See Detroit Football Club v. Robinson, 186 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. La. 1960), af['d on
other grounds, 283 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1960); New York Giants v. Los Angeles Chargers, 291
F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1960); Chicago Cardinals Football Club, Inc. v. Etcheverry, Civ. No. 3i86
(D.C. N.M. June 26, 1956) (unreported decision).
58. The initial contracts were unenforceable due to the NFL standard player contract,
which contained a clause making the approval of the league commissioner a condition prece-
dent to the execution of the contract. As the teams would certainly not submit such "secret"
contracts to the commissioner for his approval, the players were free to make a second con-
tract in spite of the first. See GALLNER, supra note 8, at 57.
59. 361 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 840 (1967).
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valid reason to breach the contract:
While we do not for a moment condone the ruthless methods employed by
professional football teams in their contest for the services of college football
players, including the lavish expenditure of money, it must be conceded that
there is no legal impediment to contracting for the services of athletes at any
time, and the above mentioned conduct, while regrettable, does not furnish
athletes with a legal excuse to avoid their contracts for reasons other than the
temptations of a more attractive offer.6 0
While it is apparent that agents are not always involved in
these transactions,61 their presence is often a motivating factor in
causing an amateur to sign a pre-graduation contract.2 It is the
opinion of at least one commentator that "secret signing"-caused
litigation would have been avoided if the athletes in question had
been represented by attorneys rather than non-legally trained
agents:
When an athlete breached his first contract by deciding to play with another
team, he was forced to employ legal counsel to argue his case in court on the
ground that his initial contract was invalid. Perhaps if the athlete had re-
tained an attorney to conduct his negotiations from the beginning, he could
have saved the subsequent legal fees paid for defending the breach of con-
tract action brought against him. The reason the fees could have been saved
is that it is likely that a secret signing, before his college eligibility had ex-
pired, would have never taken place. 3
III. 'How THE PROBLEMS AROSE
A. Agents Are Not Required to be Licensed or Regulated
Although many agents are highly reputable,64 there are no re-
strictions or regulations that would serve to insure that all, or at
least most, of them are capable of doing the job they hold them-
60. 361 F.2d at 41.
61. See text & accompanying notes 11-14 supra, for a discussion of the Los Angeles
Rams' case.
62. Note that the extent to which college athletes enter into pre-graduation agreements
is unclear, as such contracts usually are not made a matter of public record in order to
protect the player's college eligibility.
63. GALLNER, supra note 8, at 60. One reason for such an assertion is that it is more
likely that an agent with a legal background would have secured a contract acceptable to the
athlete in the first place. In addition, an attorney would have more respect for the sanctity
of contracts, as well as an awareness of the consequences of a breach of contract action.
Thus, even if the athlete received a more favorable second offer, there would be less chance
of an agent encouraging him to take it if that agent were an attorney.
64. See text & accompanying note 5 supra.
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selves out to do.6 5 For example, agents need no law degree or agent
license. In addition, "[t]here are no agents' associations or other
such bodies that set ethical standards and police the profession.""8
Fortunately, those who are lawyers are governed by the bar as-
sociations and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Regulation of
non-attorney agents has been left to the inconsistent efforts of the
respective players associations. Although proposals have been
made to set up unified licensing requirements for sports agents,"
none have as of yet been implemented. It is not far-fetched to con-
clude that the lack of restrictions placed on those trying to enter
the field and the lack of sanctions imposed on those who have not
acted in their client's best interests are major causes of the wide-
spread abuse that has taken place. The Commissioner of the Na-
tional Basketball Association, Lawrence F. O'Brien, well aware of
the lack of regulation, has observed that "[a]t some point, some-
where, someone is going to realize that there are people walking
around with briefcases in sports who nobody knows and who are
accountable to no one."68
The problem is aggravated by the fact that there are many
persons active in the circles of professional sports who do not share
the view that regulation is needed. This type of thinking was ex-
emplified by. the testimony of agent Jack Mills before the House of
Representatives Select Committee Inquiry Into Professional
Sports: "[The agent business] is sort of a self-regulating thing in
the sense that people who are not doing a good job are going to be
eliminated because the players are going to tell their
friends .. ."9 However, the problem with this popular notion of
"weeding out the bad apples" was inadvertently pointed out by
agent Mills himself during the very same testimony:
[T]he field is growing rapidly, I could not over emphasize that because there
are so many people coming in and out of this profession that it is very diffi-
cult for us to know and it is very difficult for the players to know who is
65. Agency law does not require the agent to have any technical expertise as a "person
who can act for himself is generally capable of acting as agent for another. 2A C.J.S.
Agency § 29 (1972).
66. FINAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 72.
67. See id. at 78-79, which concedes that federal regulation of agents may be needed if
the efforts to resolve the abuses by the professional sports teams themselves fail.
68. N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1977, § 5 at 15, col. 1.
69. PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 4, at 209.
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really qualified to do a job and who has their best interests at heart.70
The Richard Sorkin situation" is proof that agent Mill's
"weeding out the bad apples" system of agent regulation cannot
work. Sorkin's business, which lasted four years, was legitimate for
a while. It was not until he was swamped by losses from bad in-
vestments that he began misappropriating clients' money. Thus, as
Sorkin's reputation did not become tarnished until long after many
players had entered into agency agreements with him, there was no
way to stop his business by "word of mouth" until it was too late.
One definite problem caused by the lack of regulation and li-
censing requirements is that individuals with criminal records are
allowed to enter the sports agent market. For example, the Presi-
dent of Probus Management,7 2 Norman Young, had served jail
terms for several felony convictions, including grand larceny,
before he began his career as an agent.73 That such a person should
not be handling athletes' finances became even more apparent
when Young was found liable in the subsequent Burrow decision.
Of course, had Young been an attorney, he would have lost his li-
cense to practice law after his initial felony conviction. 4
B. The American Bar Association's Prohibition Against
Solicitation
By entering into an agreement with an athlete, an agent im-
pliedly represents that he possesses the standard knowledge and
skill needed to adequately represent his client.7 5 Thus, the agent
must be able to negotiate contracts, handle investments, endorse-
ments, tax-planning and the like.76  However, as already demon-
70. Id. at 202.
71. See text & accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
72. The defendant in Burrow v. Probus Management, Inc., Civ. No. 16840 (N.D. Ga.,
Aug. 9, 1973) (unpublished order).
73. New York Select Committee Hearings, supra note 24, at 244-46.
74. Pursuant to DR 1-102(A)(4), "A lawyer shall not ... [e]ngage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." As a result, "[m]ost states make conviction
for a felony grounds for automatic disbarment." Note, Disbarment: Non-Professional Con-
duct Demonstrating Unfitness to Practice, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 489, 490 (1958).
75. See generally 3 Am. JuR. 2d Agency §§ 202-05.
76. An athlete can protect himself to some degree by entering into a written agreement,
with the agent he selects to represent him, which states what duties the agent is expected to
perform. For one example of such an agreement, see GALLNER, supra note 8, at 173-76.
However, it is likely that an experienced attorney would be able to handle such matters
more adequately than would be the non-lawyer agent. In fact, an athlete hiring an agent is
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strated by this Comment, many agents are seriously deficient in
these crucial areas. Although there may exist some legal recourse
that an athlete can take against an incompetent agent,7" it often
comes too late; that is, failure to properly manage his finances
early in his relatively short career often proves to be a financial
catastrophe for the athlete.78
As remedies for the poorly managed athlete may not become
available until it is too late to repair the damage done, the obvious
solution would be to insure that the player is represented by a
competent agent from the start. Unfortunately, the American Bar
Association's restrictions against client solicitation make this diffi-
cult. Pursuant to DR 2-103(a) of the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility, "[a] lawyer shall not. . . recommend employment
as a private practitioner. . . to a lay person who has not sought
his advice. . . ." In the legal field, the prohibition against solicita-
tion is fair in most contexts as it applies to all lawyers equally.
However, since not all sports agents are attorneys, the rule gives an
unfair advantage to non-lawyer representatives. The distinction
between lawyer and non-lawyer agents becomes critical in light of
the fact that the solicitation efforts of non-lawyer agents are per-
haps the most flagrant examples of unscrupulous conduct. One ex-
ample of this-already discussed in this Comment-is the illegal
recruitment of college athletes.79
While the restrictions set forth by the National Collegiate
Athletic Association potentially restrict the influx of non-lawyer
agents into the amateur arena,80 it is becoming obvious that many
of these agents are in complete contempt of the rules. For example,
in 1979 highly successful agent Mike Trope was quoted as saying:
The rules are ridiculous and they're not being followed by anybody ....
Why should I honor the NCAA rules when I'm not even bound by them? And
I don't- intend to honor them, not ever, unless Congress says all the rules of
the NCAA are laws of the United States, and you can go to prison if you
in danger of encountering more than poor financial advice: the agent's conduct might reach
the level of illegality. For example, the State of California brought an action against an
agent for violation of the California Securities Code and grand theft, as a result of the
agent's illegal solicitation of investment money ($72,000) from professional athletes. See
GALLNER, supra note 8, at 64.
77. See, e.g., text & accompanying notes 88-115, 143-170 supra.
78. See text & accompanying notes 8-10 supra.
79. See text & accompanying notes 53-64 supra.




The lengths non-attorney agents will go to in recruiting clients
are appalling. For example, some agents have offered players mon-
etary bribes. "If I talk to a player, and he needs a thousand dollars,
I've got the money to give him."82 Other agents use the common
tool of telling a recent college graduate that they can affect the
athlete's position in the upcoming player draft. In reality, an agent
has no power or authority to alter the draft selections in any way.83
Non-attorney agents are also notorious for slandering each
other in attempts to increase their chances of recruiting a client,
8 4
or attempting to impress prospective clients by claiming to re-
present well-known professional athletes who they in fact do not
represent.8 Finally, a number of agents have engaged in bribing
the college coaches of players in order to secure these athletes as
clients.8 6
In essence, there exists an inherent "Catch-22" situation in
the agent-athlete relationship; while an athlete would be better off
being represented by an attorney-agent,87 the ABA solicitation
81. McLeese, A Whole New Ballgame for Lawyers, STUDENT LAWYER, Oct. 1980, at 46.
82. Sports agent Mike Trope, quoted in Black, A Hard Look at Agents, SPORT, Dec.
1979, at 77. Some agents loan money to an athlete on the condition that the athlete select
the agent to be his representative.
83. Id. at 77.
84. Id. Of course, attorney-agents are prohibited from engaging in such unethical
conduct.
85. Id. at 81.
86. In 1978, during testimony before the New York State Senate Committee Hearing,
agent Alphonse Dotson testified that "[t]here is an unofficial referral system. You have to
understand that, per se, assistant coaches don't make as much money as head coaches and
when they can get their hands on tax-free money they will refer kids." New York Select
Committee, supra note 24, at 191.
87. Many commentators share the view that the attorney-agent is more likely to act in
the best interests of the athlete. Others maintain that the actions of attorney-agents also
leave something to be desired. See, e.g., FISCHLER, supra note 19. In support of this notion,
it does appear that attorneys would be benefited by better education in the context of sports
law. For example, only a handful of the 160 or so ABA-accredited schools offer courses in
sports law. When contrasted with the education of most non-attorney agents, this is merely
a minor drawback. Chicago sports lawyer Jeffrey Jacobs, when asked whether or not it is
advantageous for an athlete to be represented by an attorney, responded: ". . . I think law-
yers are better educated than the general agent . . . . Before you can negotiate a football
contract, you have to have an intimate knowledge of the National Football League collective
bargaining agreement. . . [as well as] arbitration decisions. . . and general litigation ..
McLeese, supra note 81, at 46.
Some agents assert that non-lawyer agents can circumvent their legal inadequacies by
hiring attorneys to assist them in complex areas. PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 4,
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provisions make it easier for the non-lawyer to obtain clients.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE AGENT-ATHLETE DILEMMA
It is obvious that the frequency of agent abuses in professional
and amateur sports has increased dramatically in the past decade.
Therefore, it would seem that litigation in this area would be ex-
tensive. On the contrary, however, the actual number of decisions
is quite small indeed."'
One possible reason for the near absence of litigation is that
the opportunity to sue an attorney for malpractice is removed in
the event that the agent is not a lawyer. In addition, agents who
have mismanaged athletes' funds (such as Richard Sorkin) often
wind up in the throes of bankruptcy, leaving no pool of assets from
which the athlete may collect. This was a bar to recovery in Bur-
row v. Probus Management, Inc.;9 suits against the company itself
would have been useless as it had gone out of business.90
"Despite these drawbacks, it seems inevitable that the courts
will eventually turn to causes of action and remedies arising from
agency and contract principles91 in-order to hold sports agents lia-
at 200. The problem with this assertion is that the agent is going to have to share his com-
mission with the attorney, which would encourage the agent to try to handle the matters on
his own. In addition, any possible merit to such a proposal is removed by the regulations of
the ABA itself. The ABA CANONS mandate that:
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by
any lay agency ... which intervenes between client and lawyer. A lawyer's re-
sponsibilities and qualifications are individual. He should avoid all regulations
which direct the performance of his duties by or in the interest of such interme-
diary. A lawyer's relation to his client should be personal, and the responsibility
should be directed to the client.
ABA CANON 35.
The ABA has determined that even a ten percent interest of the agent in the principal
would not alter the fact that the lawyer's responsibility should be directed at his principal.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES, IN FOR-
MAL Op. 473 (1941).
88. Expanding the sports agent concept to include the representation of entertainment
figures in general still turns up a small number of cases. Aside from the cases mentioned in
this Comment, these decisions include: Campos v. Olson, 241 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1957);
George Foreman Associates Ltd. v. Foreman, 389 F. Supp. 1308 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 517
F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1975); Russell-Stewart, Inc. v. Birkett, 24 Misc. 2d 528, 201 N.Y.S.2d 687
(Sup. Ct. 1960); Trammell v. Morgan, 158 N.E.2d 541 (Ohio App. 1957); and cases cited in
Annot., 175 A.L.R. 617 (1948).
89. See text & accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
90. New York Select Committee, supra note 24 at 244.
91. See text & accompanying notes 149-70 infra.
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ble for their misdeeds. In support of this view, one commentator
has stated that "[c]ontroversies which arise will raise basically
questions of agency and contract, and case laws from those general
areas will provide precedent for resolving sports-related
controversies.
92
Leaving agency and contract remedies aside for the moment,
there are a number of other promising solutions that might provide
recourse for the wronged athlete.
A. Regulation of Sports Agents by the Individual States: The
California Approach
In 1981, the State of California decided that the practically
unrestricted activities of sports agents needed to be regulated in
some manner. Therefore, the California legislature added a new
section to California's Labor Code,93 which promises to greatly re-
duce the potential for abuse inherent in the agent-athlete relation-
ship. The pertinent provisions of the new statute are as follows.
Section 1500 defines the applicability of the new chapter. It
states that the statute applies to "athlete agenc[ies]," and goes on
to state that the term "athlete agency" does not include "any
member of the State Bar of California when acting as legal counsel
for any person." 94 This is of crucial importance, as it focuses regu-
lation where it is needed most: on the practices of non-attorney
agents and not those who have obtained a law degree and are rep-
resenting clients on legal matters.
Section 1510 provides that "[n]o person shall engage or carry
on the occupation of an athletic agency without first registering
with the Labor Commissioner."
Section 1511 provides that prospective agents must submit an
application for registration to the Labor Commissioner, accompa-
nied by at least two affidavits from "reputable residents," who can
attest to the "good moral character" of the applicant. This is im-
portant with respect to non-attorney agents as it subjects them to
some type of character investigation, which is of course a prerequi-
site to an attorney's admission to the respective state bar
associations.
92. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 6, at 323.
93. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1500 et seq. (West 1981).
94. Id. at § 1500(b).
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Section 1513 provides that the Labor Commissioner "may re-
fuse to grant a license," which, pursuant to Section 1514, will effec-
tively prevent the rejected agent from resubmitting an application
for a three year period.
Section 1515 provides that every license must be renewed at
one year intervals, which will provide policing of agents like Rich-
ard Sorkin95-whose business was legitimate at the start-from
further representation of athletes.
Sections 1519 and 1520 provide that each athlete agency must
submit a $10,000 surety bond to the Labor Commissioner, which
will insure that all applicants:
will comply with this chapter and will pay all sums due any individual or
group of individuals when [his agent] has received such sums, and will pay all
damages occasioned to any person by reason of misstatement, misrepresenta-
tion, fraud, deceit, or any unlawful acts or omissions of [the agent].
Section 1527 provides that the Labor Commissioner may re-
voke or suspend any registration if the agent has violated any pro-
vision of the chapter, has ceased to be of good moral character, or
if the conditions under which the registration was issued have been
altered.
Section 1530 provides that the Labor Commissioner must ap-
prove of all the contract forms used by each agent. This will serve
to prevent "unfair, unjust, and oppressive" contracts, which are
often used to the disadvantage of naive athletes. In addition, each
contract must provide on its face that "[t]his athlete agency is reg-
istered with the Labor Commissioner of the State of California."
Section 1530.5 provides that each contract must also contain a
provision in at least 10-point type stating "the athlete may jeop-
ardize his or her standing as an amateur athlete by entering into
the contract." This will at least serve as a warning to college ath-
letes, although the practical effects have yet to be seen.
Section 1531 provides that all agents shall file a schedule of
fees with the Labor Commissioner. This will help reduce some of
the abuses surrounding agents' fees previously mentioned in this
Comment. 96
Section 1533 provides that the agent's books and records shall
be open to the inspection of the Labor Commissioner.
95. See text & accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
96. See text & accompanying notes 30-36 supra.
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Section 1536 provides that no agent shall issue a contract con-
taining any term or condition in violation of law.
Section 1537 provides that no agent shall place any false,
fraudulent, or misleading information in an advertisement, or
make any false representations concerning his employment. This
will serve to hinder the unscrupulous solicitation efforts of non-
attorney agents.
Section 1541, relating to fees collected for obtaining employ-
ment for an athlete-client, states that all fees must be refunded in
the event that the agent fails to procure the promised employment.
In addition, it provides that the agent must pay to the athlete a
penalty in the amount of the fee in the event that the fee in ques-
tion is not refunded within 48 hours after demand therefor.
Section 1545 states that an agent must file a copy of his regis-
tration certificate with the secondary or post-secondary educa-
tional institution of any student athlete he seeks to represent. This
must be done prior to the initial communication with the athlete.
In addition, any subsequent agency agreements entered into must
also be filed with the respective institutions.
Section 1546 provides that any agency contract that fails to
comply with sections 1510 or 1545 will be void and unenforceable.
The threat of losing his commission will certainly encourage an
agent to comply with these provisions.
Finally, section 1547 provides that any violation of the statute
is a "misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not less than one thou-
sand dollars ($1,000) or imprisonment for a period of not more
than 60 days, or both."
California is not the only state that has considered or enacted
an agent-regulating statute. For example, the New York Select
Committee on Crime has supported the conclusion that there
should be some type of agent regulation. In furthering that end,
the Committee Hearing on Sports Agents9 concluded that sports
agents should be regulated by the individual states in the event
that no Federal legislation is enacted. The Committee went one
step further by submitting a bill to the New York State legislature
that would require the regulation of any sports agent who repre-
sented at least one athlete employed by a New York State-based
97. See New York Select Committee, supra note 24.
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team. 8 Unfortunately, the bill did not pass in 1979 or 1980 and
there are no plans to reintroduce the bill. New York has therefore
missed an excellent opportunity to enact legislation that would
serve to diminish the abuses inherent in the agent-athlete
relationship.
B. Potential Regulation by the Courts: the Zinn v. Parrish
Decision
In the recent decision of Zinn v. Parrish," sports agent Leo
Zinn sought to recover the commission due him under an agency
agreement with professional football player Lemar Parrish.
In 1971 agent Zinn, who had been in the athlete representa-
tion business for over twenty years, entered into a "Professional
Management Contract" with football player Parrish. Under the
terms of the agreement, Zinn agreed to use "reasonable efforts" to
find employment for Parrish with a professional football team. In
addition, he agreed to "act" in furtherance of Parrish's interests
by: a) negotiating job contracts; b) furnishing advice on business
investments; c) securing professional tax advice at no added cost;
98. S. 5972, submitted to the New York State Senate in 1979 and 1980 by Senator
Ralph J. Marino. The Act would amend Chapter 912 of the Laws of 1920 relating to the
regulation of boxing, sparring and wrestling,, and would provide for the licensing of sports
agents.
The pertinent provisions of the proposed bill are as follows:
Section 52 of the New York State bill would require the licensing of any agent who
represented a minimum of three athletes (including at least one whose team is located
within New York State) in a twelve-month period and who has held himself out publicly as
an agent.
Section 53 would require all agents applying for a license to disclose certain information,
including the method and nature of payment, power of attorney, prior criminal record, and
the structure of the agent's business and financial management prior to the issuance of the
license.
Section 55 provides revocation standards, which would ensure that meritorious com-
plaints regarding financial activities, fraud, or misstatements would result in disciplinary
measures. Sections 57 and 63 provide penalties for violation of the statute, ranging from
letters of reprimand from the State Athletic Commission to fines or imprisonment for up to
one year.
Section 59 would require every agent to execute and file with the Comptroller a $50,000
bond for each professional athlete represented. This would ensure that the agent abided by
the provisions of the statute and rules and regulations of the State Athletic Commission.
Section 62 would establish a sorely needed advisory council on sports agents, which
would assist the State Athletic Commission in reviewing agent-related issues.
99. 644 F.2d 360 (7th Cir. 1981).
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and d) obtaining endorsement contracts. 100 Finally, the contract
stated that Zinn would, at Parrish's request, seek to find him
"gainful off-season employment."101 The agreement itself was to be
automatically renewed unless terminated by either of the parties
by thirty days written notice to the other.102
The dispute between the parties began in 1974, when Zinn ne-
gotiated a four year series of contracts for Parrish with the Cincin-
nati Bengals of the National Football League, covering the 1974-77
seasons. Shortly after signing these agreements, Parrish, who had
become disenchanted with the quality of the services he had re-
ceived, informed Zinn that he "no longer needed his services,"110
stating that he had no intention of paying Zinn the 10% commis-
sion due under the agency contract. In response, Zinn brought suit
to recover the commission.
In the original dispostion of the case, the District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois entered summary judgment for de-
fendant Parrish.10' The court felt that the statutory definition of
"employment agency" could be expanded to include athlete agen-
cies, which meant that agent Zinn was required to be licensed
under the pertinent Illinois statute.105 As Zinn was in fact not li-
censed, his contract was void and unenforceable.
On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed and remanded the lower court's ruling in an un-
published opinion.106 On remand the district court shied away from
the conclusion that sports agents are required to be licensed as pri-
vate employment agencies. However, the court sympathized with
Parrish's plight, as it felt that Zinn "did not have the capabilities
and experience necessary to provide the services he obligated him-
self to provide." 107 This lack of expertise violated the "grea[t]
fiduciary responsibilities"108 owed by an agent to an athlete in an
100. Id. at 361.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 362.
104. 461 F. Supp. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
105. ILL. REV. STAT. 1975, ch. 48, § 197(k) provides in part: "The term 'employment
agency' means any person engaged for gain or profit in the.business of securing or attempt-
ing to secure employment for persons seeking employment or employees for employers."
106. Zinn v. Parrish, No. 77-1609 (7th Cir. 1978).
107. Docket No. 75-c-4235 at 8 (N.D. Ill. March 21, 1980).




In response to its belief that Zinn's services were inadequate,
the district court ruled that Zinn's giving of advice on business in-
vestments required him to register as an investment advisor under
the Investment Advisor's Act of 1940.109His failure to do so allowed
the court to render the agency agreement unenforceable. Thus, the
district court's holding opened the door for the use of the federal
securities laws to regulate agents who give investment advice to
their clients. However, the district court's decision was again over-
ruled by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 10 which disagreed
with the contention that Zinn was required to be registered as an
investment advisor under the 1940 Act.
While acknowledging that the 1940 Act "must be read broadly
in order to effectuate its purpose of 'protect[ing] the public and
investors against malpractices by persons paid for advising others
about securities,' "" the court of appeals felt that the district
court was "in error in concluding that Congress by the 1940 Act
'intended to regulate' the relationship between an athlete and his
manager."11
2
Despite its adverse holding, the court of appeals did not reject
the application of the Investment Advisors Act to sports agents in
all circumstances. Instead, it set out a list of factors that can be
used in the future to determine whether an agent "holds himself
out" as an investment advisor: "1 1) "'[the maintenance of a list-
ing as an investment advisor in a telephone or business directory;'
2) 'the expression of willingness to existing clients or others to ac-
cept new clients;' or 3) 'the use of a letterhead indicating any activ-
ity as an investment advisor.' M24
109. For the text of the Act, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 et seq. (1976).
110. 644 F.2d 360 (7th Cir. 1981).
111. Id. at 363 (citing SEC v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371, 1376 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970), quoting (1960) U.S. Con CONG. & AD. NEws 3503).
112. 644 F.2d at 363, n.3.
113. Id.
114. For the following reasons, the court of appeals held that Zinn did not meet the
definition of an investment advisor: 1) Zinn listed himself in his office building directory as
a "Public Relations Consultant;" 2) his telephone directory advertisement was under the
heading of "Public Relations;" 3) his letterhead did not contain the phrase "investment
advisor;" 4) the district court failed to distinguish between "ordinary business advice" and
"advice on securities;" and, 5) although Zinn did transmit securities recommendations from
third parties to Parrish, such "isolated transactions ... incident to the main purpose of his
management contract to negotiate football contracts do not constitute engaging in the busi-
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In essence, while the district court's decision in Zinn reflects a
judicial effort to aid the athlete who has not received sound advice
by expansive construction of already existing statutes, the better
solution would be to enact new statutes, either on the federal or
state115 level, that would directly regulate the agent problem. The
need for such direct regulation is certainly reflected in the court of
appeals holding in Zinn, which refused to allow the district court's
misapplication of the federal securities laws.
C. Other Potential Solutions
In response to the actions of unscrupulous sports agents such
as Richard Sorkin, the New York State Senate formed a Select
Committee to review the problem and determine whether sports
agents should be licensed or otherwise subjected to some form of
state regulation.116 The Committee felt that "some state regulation
is desirable to control sports agent abuses against players and
teams.'11 7 Sorkin, a key witness, stated that he too felt that further
agent abuses would be prevented by legislative regulation.11 8
The New York State Committee also analyzed whether or not
the various players associations in each professional league were
the proper vehicles for agent regulation. Although the associations
have explored the possibility of regulation, the Committee felt that
their "lack of enforcement power weakens their ability to safe-
guard their members."119
Another interesting point brought out by the testimony before
the New York State Committee is that it would not be a good idea
to have the various leagues regulate agents. For example, the Di-
rector of Security for the National Football League testified that
the league should not be relied upon to investigate agent abuses, as
it does not want to intrude on player-agent relationships.1 20 The
ness of advising others on investment securities." Id. at 363-64.
115. See, e.g., text & accompanying notes 93 & 98 supra.
116. New York Select Committee, supra note 24.
117. Id. at 5.
118. Id. at 92-95.
119. Id. at 5. Sorkin's testimony evidenced a reason why agents should be regulated by
a neutral body and not by the players associations. Sorkin pointed out that the head of the
National Hockey League's Players Association (NHLPA), Alan Eagleson, is himself an
agent. Id. at 88. Thus, there exists the potential for conflicts of interest by having the play-
ers' associations regulate agents.
120. Testimony of John Danahy, id. at 257. The Vice President and General Counsel of
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NFL fears that putting pressure on agents would in turn entice the
agents to create friction between the players and their teams.1 21
Thus, the professional leagues themselves are obviously not the an-
swer, as their "we don't want to upset the balance of power" atti-
tude precludes their acting to protect athletes from unscrupulous
agents.
One school of thought argues that potential abuses by agents
could be lessened by having athletic commissions regulate athlete-
agent contractual relationships. Agents wishing to represent ath-
letes would be licensed by and have their contracts filed with the
respective athletic commissions. 12 2 Such regulation has been ap-
proved by the courts on the grounds that the prevention of abuse
by players' managers is a legitimate objective of an athletic com-
mission. 123 Unfortunately, this type of regulation has been imple-
mented almost solely in the sport of boxing, and not the sports
that are the most heavily plagued by agent abuses-baseball, bas-
ketball, hockey and football.
A House of Representatives Select Committee Inquiry into
Professional Sports studied the problem of whether or not the li-
censing of agents should be a matter of federal concern.12' 4 Al-
though the Committee concluded that further inquiry into the area
was warranted, it made no move towards federal licensing, al-
though it did state that this might be considered in the future.1 25
The Committee felt that regulation should be left to the respective
players associations and leagues. However, there are definite
problems with this suggestion. 26 For example, the National Hock-
ey League Players Association, which is admittedly concerned
about agents, has chosen not to implement licensing requirements
at the present: "We have found that even if we recommend certain
agents as having satisfactory backgrounds, other agents whom we
do not mention take umbrage at our suggestions. 1 27
the NHL testified that the league generally does not investigate agent abuses. Id. at 277. For
example, the NHL Board of Governors took no action in the aftermath of the Richard
Sorkin fiasco. Id. at 293.
121. Id.
122. See WEiSTART & LOWELL, supra note 6, at 152.
123. Ali v. State Athletic Commission, 308 F. Supp. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
124. FINAL REPORT, supra note 20.
125. New York Select Committee, supra note 24 at 79.
126. See text & accompanying notes 119-121 supra.
127. Personal letter of Oct. 29, 1980 from Alan Eagleson, the head of the NHLPA, to
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The National Football League Players Association (NFLPA)
has taken some positive steps. Starting in 1975, it has sponsored a
series of legal seminars, which were geared towards educating both
lawyer and non-lawyer agents in the proper representation of the
professional athlete. Topics covered included contract negotiations,
tax planning, grievance procedures and fringe benefits.128 The
NFLPA has also pioneered an informational service for agents,
which provides quarterly reports on the status of sports litigation
and legislation, in exchange for an annual fee. 29 Finally, as a pol-
icy measure, the NFLPA attempts to convince first-year players to
dismiss any non-attorney agents they have hired.1 30
Ed Garvey, executive director of the NFLPA, has suggested
that players' unions in each sport compile lists of "good" and
"bad" agents, thereby providing athletes with some forewarning of
who the unscrupulous operators are. However, for reasons stated
previously in this Comment,"31 such an approach will not have
much of an impact.
Yet another solution, and one that is already in use, is to have
attorney-agents refrain from doing any actual legal work, which
would enable them to solicit clients without violating the ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility.13 2 The attorney-agents would
employ other attorneys when they needed legal work done. How-
ever, this approach does nothing to help those attorneys who want
to be able to represent athletes on legal matters, nor does it do
anything to stop the flood of abuses by non-lawyer agents.
D. Relaxing the ABA Prohibitions Against Solicitation
A promising solution to the problems created by dishonest and
incompetent agents would be for the ABA to relax its prohibitions
against solicitation, which would allow lawyer-agents to compete
for clients with non-lawyer agents. Recent case law indicates that
hope for such a solution exists. For example, in Bates v. State Bar
the author of this Comment.
128. FINAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 72.
129. Id.
130. GALLNER, supra note 8, at 63.
131. See text & accompanying notes 70 & 71 supra.
132. See Golenbach, supra note 5, at 50; PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 4, at




of Arizona,5s the Supreme Court opened the door to advertising
by attorneys. The subsequent ABA amendments to Canon 2 or the
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility reflect the Court's
holding.
1 3 4
In a 1980 decision, In re Koffler,1 85 the New York State Court
of Appeals held that New York lawyers could advertise their ser-
vices to potential clients by mail, ruling that such actions consti-
tuted commercial speech protected by the First Amendment. In
Koffler, the New York Appellate Division had previously con-
cluded that client solicitation by mail violated section 47a of the
Judiciary Law and DR 2-103(A) of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility.13 In reversing that decision, the Court of Appeals
stressed that the two provisions may constitutionally regulate, but
not proscribe, direct solicitation by mail. The Court also pointed
out that a factor in its decision was the need to assure "informed
and reliable decision making. 13 7 Thus, the Koffler decision has
made possible wider solicitation of clients by attorney-agents.
Attorneys will now be able to use the mails to solicit athletes who
are about to enter the ranks of professional sports. Therefore, ath-
letes will have a greater awareness of the availability of competent
legal services necessary to meet their needs.
Despite the advances made by the Koffler case, the decision
may cause problems of its own. Unlike the usual modes of attorney
advertising, such as the newspaper, television, or radio, direct mail
goes only to the addressee. As Judge Meyer in the Koffler case
pointed out, the temptation for deception will be "therefore,
greater, and the probability of exposure less, than for those more
133. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Advertising by lawyers was originally outlawed in 1908 when
the ABA adopted a formal ban on lawyer solicitation.
134. ABA CANON 2.
135. 51 N.Y.2d 140, 412 N.E.2d 927, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1980).
136. Both provisions mandate that an attorney cannot recommend himself for
employment.
137. 51 N.Y.2d at 148, 412 N.E.2d at 932, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (citing Bates v. State Bar
of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977)).
138. Note that the Koffler decision only applies to direct mailings by attorneys; the
court did not address the issue of whether attorneys could solicit clients by using third
parties as a conduit to do the mailing for them. However, a recent New York Appellate
Division decision, In re Alan I. Greene, 78 A.D.2d 131, 433 N.Y.S.2d 853 (2d Dep't 1980),
has restricted third party solicitation. The court held that such mailings were not protected




public media."139 Despite such a possibility, it appears that there
will still be ample public protection. For example, New York has a
filing requirement for retainer statements, which is contained in
the Appellate Division's rule 691.20.140 Other courts have con-
cluded that such a filing requirement for solicitation letters does
indeed assure ample public protection.4
E. Suing Non-Attorney Agents for Practicing Law Without a
License
Doubts as to the legality of non-lawyer representation of ath-
letes are becoming more and more commonplace.1 42 Support for
this trend can be found in state statutes, which provide that no
persons shall be permitted to "practice law" without first obtaining
a license.14  The "practice of law" has been defined as including
"services rendered out of court [including] the giving of advice or
rendering any service requiring the use of any legal skill or knowl-
edge. .... "144 It has been held that the non-licensed practice of
law is an illegal usurpation of the privilege of being an attorney
and constitutes contempt of court.
145
Some of the services agents perform for athletes fit into the
realm of the illegal practice of law. For example, when dealing with
the area of contractual negotiations, the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington noted that "the court should exercise its inherent power to
confine... the preparation of contracts for others for those that
are licensed to practice law in this state.
1 4
139. 51 N.Y.2d at 149, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 878.
140. 22 N.Y. CT. RULES § 691.20.
141. Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933, 934 (Ky. 1978).
142. For example, Chicago sports lawyer Jeffrey Jacobs has stated that:
I think the ABA, the Illinois Bar Association, the Chicago Bar Associa-
tion-somebody-should file a suit against these agents for unauthorized prac-
tice of law. When an agent is sitting in there negotiating a contract, I think he's
practicing law to a certain extent. It goes way beyond the question of dollars.
There are laws in the state of Illinois that state if you're going to represent
somebody and you're not a lawyer, you have to register to become an employ-
ment agency, which a lot of these people don't do.
Cited in McLeese, supra note 81, at 46.
143. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 13, § 1 (Smith-Hund 1963).
144. People v. Peters, 10 IM. 2d 577, 580, 141 N.E.2d 9, 11 (1957).
145. Biggs v. Plebanek, 343 Ill. App. 466, 99 N.E.2d 363 (1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
912 (1952). Such contempt of court might expose the actor to criminal prosecution. People
ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Barasch, 21 IM. 2d 407, 173 N.E.2d 417 (1961).
146. Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, 251 P.2d 619, 622
[Vol. 30
AGENT-ATHLETE RELATIONSHIP
In many cases, courts rely on the need for public protection in
determining whether or not a non-attorney's actions come under
the heading of the "practice of law. ' 147 It is not far-fetched to con-
clude that the unscrupulous actions of non-attorney sports agents
will sufficiently endanger public well being under such a definition
as to constitute an illegal practice of law. Clearly, both the athlete
and the fan are suffering from these actions; the athlete, obviously,
from the types of problems already outlined in this Comment, and
the fan from the diversion of his attention from the respective
sports themselves.
F. Solutions Inherent in Agency Law
It is inevitable that the basic principles of agency law itself
will make remedies available for the athlete. 48 For example, if an
agent's failure to use reasonable care, diligence, and judgment has
caused harm to the principal, he will be liable for any resulting
damage. 49 In determining whether or not a reasonable degree of
care has been exercised, the agent must measure up to the stan-
dard of skill possessed by other agents engaged in the same busi-
ness; that is, he must be able to negotiate contracts, formulate in-
vestment plans, and the like as well as the average sports agent.1 50
(Wash. 1952) (Donworth, J., concurring).
147. "That is, the courts will ask whether the activity, if undertaken by laymen, will
harm the public. If so, it is included within their definition of the 'practice of law'." Com-
ment, Control of the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Scope of Inherent Judicial Power, 28
U. CHi. L. REv. 162, 166 (1960); West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 144 W.Va. 504, 109
S.E.2d 420, 435 (1959).
148. As each party to an agency relationship have responsibilities to the other, there
also exists remedies for an agent who has been wronged by an athlete. For example, an
agent can bring an action for an unjustifiably breached contract. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 463 (1958); 3 AM. JurL 2d Agency § 38 (1962). However, the agent will not have a
cause of action against a third party who fails to perform a contract that the agent has
negotiated for the athlete (RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 363 (1958)), unless the
agent has a personal interest in the contract itself. Id. at § 372.
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 378, 379, 422-431. However, the agent is not
liable for honest mistakes if he exercises reasonable skill. Hartzell v. Bank of Murray, 211
Ky. 263, 277 S.W. 270 (1925).
150. See generally McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 347 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. La. 1972),
aff'd, 477 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1973); United States Liability Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc.,
1 Cal. 3d 586, 463 P.2d 770, 83 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1970); Highway Ins. Underwriters v. Lufkin-
Beaumont Motor Coaches, Inc., 215 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948). As sports agents hold
themselves out as having particular skills in a certain field, they must exceed the capabilities
of ordinary citizens. Isham v. Post, 141 N.Y. 100, 35 N.E. 1084 (1894).
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In the event that an agent has given his best efforts, but lacks the
ability to manage the athlete properly, he is still liable for any
damage caused by his ineptitude, as he should not have attempted
to do that which he was incapable of performing.151 This principle
serves to give the athlete legal recourse against the many unquali-
fied agents that dot the professional sports landscape.
Agency law also dictates that an agent will be liable to the
athlete for all damage that is the natural result of his actions.
152
However, the amount of damage that actually occurs is the limit of
the agent's liability; the athlete cannot recover if the agent can
show that no damage resulted from his actions.
15 3
Conversion of the athlete's funds, as in People v. Sorkin,
1 5
4
will also render the agent liable in tort.155 This liability stems from
the duty imposed upon the agent to keep the property and funds
of the athlete separate from his own.156
The wronged athlete also has available the remedy of cancel-
ling the agent's contract.157 For example, except in situations in-
volving express reservation in the agency agreement, the athlete
can cancel the contract for cause, depending upon the circum-
151. An agent is under a duty not to attempt the impossible or the impracticable if that
will subject the principal to the risk of expense. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 384
(1958).
152. 3 AM. JuR. 2d Agency § 209 (1962).
153. Folsom v. Mussey, 10 Me. 297 (1833). The agent can also escape liability if the
athlete has ratified the neglectful act. Bell v. Cunningham, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 69 (1830).
154. See text & accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
155. Reeside v. Reeside, 49 Pa. 322 (1865). The agent will also be liable for interest
accrued from the date of conversion. Thompson v. Stewart, 3 Conn. 171 (1819).
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 398 (1958). The law will not permit one per-
son to secure the funds of another in his capacity as an agent, and then use the other's
funds for his own benefit, without also implying a promise on his part to repay, which may
be enforced in an action of assumpsit. Piedmont Grocery Co. v. Hawkins, 83 W.Va. 180, 98
S.E. 152 (1919).
157. The agency relationship can be terminated by the act or agreement of the athlete
or his agent, or by operation of law. See generally Annot., 9 A.L.R. 223 (1920). If the agree-
ment between the parties specifies no time for termination of the agency, the contract and
authority may be revoked by the principal after the expiration of a "reasonable time." RE-
STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 105 (1958). What is "reasonable" depends upon the facts
and circumstances of the particular case. See generally Annot., 89 A.L.R. 258 (1934); An-
not., 85 A.L.R.2d 1344 (1962).
Inherent in agency law is the premise that the principal has the power to terminate his
agent's authority at will. However, if such termination violates an existing contract, the
principal will be liable to the agent for damages. Shelley v. Maccabees, 183 F. Supp. 681
(E.D.N.Y. 1960).
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stances of the particular case.1 1 A justifiable cancellation15' will
leave the agent without any redress whatsoever, except with re-
spect to commissions due for services already rendered. 60 How-
ever, there is authority for the view that a principal who has been
ignorant of his agent's unfaithful acts may recover any commis-
sions already paid, as an unfaithful agent is not entitled to any
compensation. 161
In the context of conflicts of interest, agency law provides a
remedy in the event that the agent has, for example, acted on be-
half of both adverse parties to a transaction (such as the athlete
and the team owner). If the agent has not received the consent of
the parties in regard to the dual representation, he will be pre-
vented from recovering commissions from either.162 Representation
of the second party automatically forfeits the right to compensa-
tion from the first. If the second party has no knowledge of the
existence of the first, the commission will again be lost. However, if
the second employer is indeed aware of the first engagement, "then
both he and the agent are guilty of the wrong committed against
the first employer, and the law will not enforce an executory con-
tract entered into in fraud of the rights of the first employer."1 63
As the contract violates public policy, it is rendered void.
From a tactical standpoint, the athlete has several avenues of
action he can take against an agent who has wronged him. For ex-
ample, he can pursue an action based on the contract itself for fail-
ure to perform.1" Or the athlete can sue to recover any funds re-
158. See generally Armot., 32 A.L.R. 227 (1924), Annot., 52 A.L.R. 548 (1928), Annot.,
89 A.L.R. 257 (1934).
159. Examples of what constitutes grounds for justifiable cancellation include serious
neglect or breach of duty by the agent (Scriven v. Wintersteem, 69 S.D. 515, 12 N.W.2d 371
(1943)); dishonesty or untrustworthiness of the agent (DeFranco v. Shedden, 251 A.D. 720,
295 N.Y.S. 370 (1937)); disloyalty of the agent, such as pursuing interests adverse to those of
the principal (Clark v. Delano, 205 Mass. 224, 91 N.E. 299 (1910)); or the use of the agency
as a conduit to profits for the agent himself (Michigan Crown Fender Co. v. Welch, 211
Mich. 148, 178 N.W. 684 (1920)).
160. The discharge of an agent for just cause terminates all rights to commissions not
already earned and accrued. Bilz v. Powell, 50 Colo. 482, 117 P. 344 (1911).
161. Wechsler v. Bowman, 285 N.Y. 284, 34 N.E. 322, Annot., 134 A.L.R. 1346 (1941).
However, the rule that an unfaithful agent may be denied a commission is not an absolute
one; the decision to grant or deny a commission ultimately depends upon the court's discre-
tion. Shulkin v. Shulkin, 301 Mass. 184, 16 N.E.2d 644 (1938).
162. Wadsworth v. Adams, 138 U.S. 380 (1890).
163. 3 AM. JUR. 2d Agency § 254 (1962).
164. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 400 (1958). An agent who violates a duty
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ceived by the agent,165 or seek to recover damages for agent-caused
torts.166 The athlete can also pursue equitable remedies, such as
an action for an accounting.
1 67
Unfortunately for the athlete, agency principles dictate that
he will be bound by contracts negotiated by his agent, even in situ-
ations where the agent has acted adversely to his interests, as long
as the other party to the contract has no knowledge of the agent's
dereliction of duty.168 However, the athlete will not be bound by
the contract if the other party knows or should have known that
the agent has acted in an adverse manner.6 9
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it appears that a combination of two of the
above solutions would be the most effective method of curbing
agent abuses: 1) A continued relaxation of the ABA solicitation re-
strictions; 2) Requiring licensing for all agents, or at least those not
possessing a license to practice law.17 0 Due to the conflicting per-
sonal interests of the respective leagues and players associations,
licensing should be implemented through a neutral body, such as a
"professional association" for agents, or, preferably, by the individ-
ual states themselves.
Finally, it appears that even now the number of athletes re-
owed his principal may be considered in breach of his contract so as to entitle the principal
to the contract remedies of recision or damages. Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir.
1958).
165. Piedmont Grocery v. Hawkins, 83 W.Va. 180, 98 S.E. 152 (1919). This remedy may
prove useful in future Sorkin-type situations. See text & accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
166. City Nat. Bank v. Clinton County Nat. Bank, 49 Ohio 351, 30 N.E. 958 (1892).
167. See 3 AM. JUR. 2d Agency § 330 (1962). As in any legal context, there are various
limitations that may hamper an athlete's efforts to bring an action against his agent. For
example, general statutes of limitation will apply. Id. at § 332. In addition, the agent may be
able to defend against the action by showing, for example, that he was merely following the
instructions of his principal. Brush v. Herlihy, 8 Ohio Dec. Reprint 104. Finally, the agent
may be able to avoid, or reduce, in comparative negligence jurisdictions, liability by showing
that the athlete was contributorily negligent or that there was a failure to mitigate damages.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 415 (1958).
168. Guardian Foundation v. Turner, 191 Okla. 313, 129 P.2d 592 (1942). "The princi-
pal, having selected his representative and vested him with apparent authority, should be
the loser in such a case, and not the innocent party who relied thereon." 3 Am. JUR. 2d
Agency § 270 (1962); Exchange Bank v. Monteath, 26 N.Y. 505 (1863).
169. 3 Am. JUR. 2d Agency § 270 (1962).
170. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1500-47 (West 1982), which provides for licensing of
only non-attorney agents. See text & accompanying notes 93-97 supra.
[Vol. 30
1981] 1 AGENT-ATHLETE RELATIONSHIP 849
taining reputable firms is increasing, with the unscrupulous opera-
tors playing a less significant role. This trend, coupled with an in-
crease in regulation such as the newly-enacted California statute,
may result in more honest and competent representation by agents
in the future.
JEFFREY P. CRANDALL

